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INTRODUCTION 
 The American patent system was founded on a balance between principles of disclosure 
and exclusivity.  The government asks the inventor to provide a complete description of his 
invention in sufficient detail that others skilled in the area would understand and be able to 
practice the invention.  In exchange, the government grants the inventor a temporary right to 
exclude all others from practicing the invention.  This period of exclusivity allows the inventor 
to recoup his research expenses in developing the invention and provides additional financial 
incentives that reward innovation.   
 As federal agencies grew in both number and power, they began to affect the individual 
rights of the people.  In the case of patent rights, federal agencies affected the balance between 
disclosure and exclusivity.  The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) created regulations that 
altered the “effective” patent term for products subject to the Federal Food, Drug, and 
Cosmetic Act (FDCA).  Under the FDCA, certain products are required to undergo testing and 
the data must be submitted to and approved by the FDA before the product can enter the 
market.  As a result, there may be a lapse of up to ten years between the conception of the 
product and actual entry into the market.  After obtaining FDA approval, the “effective” patent 
term would be shortened to ten years.1  The inventor in this situation would make a full 
disclosure of the invention, but would only receive half the payoff due to this shortening 
distortion.  The balance was upset. 
 In an effort to restore the balance, Congress passed the Hatch-Waxman Act (“the Act”).  
The Act serves two major purposes.  First, it restores the portion of the patent term lost to FDA 
testing and approval.  In other words, the Act remedies the shortening distortion of patent 
terms.  Second, the Act allows infringement free testing of the patented invention during the 
                                                 
1 This assumes a twenty year patent term. 
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patent term so long as the use is reasonably related to obtaining a federal approval.  Generic 
drug companies must still obtain FDA approval before they can enter the market at the 
expiration of the pioneer patent.  If Congress had only restored the patent term for the pioneers 
under the Act and had not granted a free testing safe harbor for FDA activities, this would have 
created an effectively lengthened patent term, as the pioneer patent holder would enjoy a 
monopoly after the patent expired while the generic brands awaited their FDA approvals.  
Therefore, the safe harbor provision is required to remedy the lengthening distortion of patent 
terms.  Besides balancing the effective patent term, the free testing safe harbor also facilitates 
generic drugs getting to the market sooner, which saves money.   
 The Hatch-Waxman Act restores some of the balance between disclosure and exclusivity, 
although the free testing safe harbor seems to erode some of the rights of pioneer patent 
holders.  The definition of “reasonably related” and “patented invention” hold the key to 
exactly what will happen to the balance in the future.  In particular, Congress and the courts 
must decide which “patented inventions” fit under the free testing safe harbor from 
infringement.  The question has recently been raised whether tools used in research qualify for 
infringement protection under the Hatch-Waxman Act.  Although a recent case has arguably 
closed the door to claiming the free testing safe harbor for commercial research tools,2 this 
paper will explore the qualification of in-house research tools for free testing in light of the 
Federal Circuit Court’s decision.  Part I details the Roche Products decision and the response 
of Congress in passing the Hatch-Waxman Act.  Part II provides an overview of the case law 
interpreting the Hatch-Waxman Act and how courts have treated the text of the statute and the 
intent of Congress to qualify various products.  Part III explores how the Proveris decision has 
left an opening for in-house research tools to claim the free testing safe harbor from 
                                                 
2 Proveris Scientific Corp. v. Innovasystems, Inc., 536 F.3d 1256 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
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infringement.  Finally, Part IV analyzes the prudence in subjecting in-house research tools to 
the free testing safe harbor and discusses the potential arguments that proponents and critics of 
this action may make. 
I. Roche Products and the Reaction From Congress 
 A. The Roche Products Decision 
 The Federal Circuit Court of Appeals considered an exemption from the patent laws then 
in force for the pursuit of FDA approval in Roche Products, Inc. v. Bolar Pharmaceutical Co.3  
The suit involved a commercially successful sleeping pill manufactured by Roche Products 
called Dalmane.4  Bolar sought to produce the generic version of the drug after Roche’s patent 
expired.5  Bolar, in an effort to be the first generic producer to the market, did not wait for the 
patent to expire in 1984 to begin acquiring data for a submission to the FDA.6  Bolar instead 
procured a sample of flurazepam hcl, the active ingredient in Dalmane, from a foreign 
manufacturer in mid-1983.7   
 The Court for the Eastern District of New York found that Bolar’s use of the patented 
drug strictly for FDA approval purposes was both de minimis and experimental.8  On appeal, 
the Federal Circuit disagreed with the district court, holding that 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) on its face 
prohibits making, using, or selling a patented invention during the term of the patent without 
consent of the patent holder.9  The court found, and Bolar conceded, that applying the common 
law experimental use doctrine to this case would be an imprudent expansion of the current 
                                                 
3 733 F.2d 858 (1984). 
4 Id. at 860. 
5 Id. 
6 Id. 
7 Id. 
8 Roche Prods., Inc. v. Bolar Pharmaceuticals Co., 572 F. Supp. 255, 257-58 (E.D.N.Y. 1983). 
9 Roche, 733 F.2d at 861. 
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doctrine.10  In Whittemore v. Cutter the court created the experimental use doctrine, holding 
that the use of a patented invention for a philosophical experiment, curiosity, or amusement is 
not an act of infringement and is instead an experimental use.11  The Federal Circuit held that 
in the present case, Bolar crossed the experimental use line because its use was ultimately for 
business purposes, though the immediate use was generating test data.12   
 The court similarly dispensed with Bolar’s public policy argument.  Bolar argued that 
owners of pharmaceutical patents retain an impermissible monopoly for a period following the 
expiration of their patent while competitors pursue FDA approval.13  The Federal Circuit 
refused to pass judgment on this issue and called on Congress to decide whether to rewrite the 
law in this area.14 
B. The Congressional Response to Roche Products 
 Congress realized that both the government and the public would save money if it was 
easier for drug companies to bring generic drugs to market, and created legislation to 
accomplish this end.15  In 1984 Congress passed the Drug Price Competition and Patent Term 
Restoration Act of 1984 (“Hatch-Waxman Act”).16  The Hatch-Waxman Act made it easier for 
generic drug manufacturers to request approval from the FDA for their generic drugs by 
allowing them to piggy back on the FDA application filed by the pioneer patent holder and file 
an Abbreviated New Drug Application (ANDA).17 
                                                 
10 Id. at 862-63. 
11 29 F. Cas. 1120, 1121 (C.C.D. Mass. 1813) (No. 17,600). 
12 Roche, 733 F.2d at 864. 
13 Id. 
14 Id. at 865. 
15 Marlan D. Walker, The Patent Research Tool Problem After Merck v. Integra, 14 Tex. Intell. Prop. L.J. 1, 18 
(2005). 
16 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (2000). 
17 Walker, supra note 15, at 19. 
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 The Hatch-Waxman Act also alleviated some legitimate concerns of pioneer drug 
manufacturers.  Prior to the 1984 Act, drug manufacturers had spent up to the first ten years of 
their patent term obtaining data, submitting an application to the FDA, and awaiting FDA 
approval.18  The Hatch-Waxman Act created a statutory remedy for this loss of patent term by 
allowing the patent holder to recover the portion of the patent term lost to pursuing approval 
from the FDA.19  However, Congress did limit the possible term extension to five years.20 
 The most important section of the Hatch-Waxman Act was written after Roche Products.  
Before the Roche Products decision, the Hatch-Waxman Act did not address any free testing 
safe harbor from infringement for generic drug manufacturers.21  After the decision, the Bolar 
Amendment was added to the Act, essentially reversing Roche Products.22  The Bolar 
Amendment exempted from infringement making, using, offering to sell, or selling a patented 
invention “solely for uses reasonably related to the development and submission of information 
under a Federal law that regulates the manufacture, use, or sale of drugs.”23  Thus, the use by 
Bolar, though outside the reach of the experimental use exception because of its commercial 
purpose, would be immunized by the free testing safe harbor of the Hatch-Waxman Act.   
II. Interpretation of the Hatch-Waxman Act 
 As with most legislation, what seemed like a straight-forward solution at the time the 
legislation was written soon became not so clear when interpreted by courts and applied to 
various fact situations.  The Hatch-Waxman Act has been interpreted by many courts since its 
                                                 
18 Id. at 17. 
19 35 U.S.C. § 156 (2000). 
20 35 U.S.C. § 156(g)(6)(A) (2000). 
21 Walker, supra note 15 at 20. 
22 DONALD K. CHISUM,, CHISUM ON PATENTS:  A TREATISE ON PATENTABILITY, VALIDITY, AND INFRINGEMENT 
(1997 & Supp. 2005); Id. 
23 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (2000). 
 7 
enactment, some making incremental changes and others making sizeable leaps to the 
understanding and application of the Act. 
 A.  Eli Lilly and Co. v. Medtronic, Inc. 
 The first major opportunity for the Supreme Court to interpret the Hatch-Waxman Act 
was in 1990.24  Eli Lilly brought suit against Medtronic for infringement of an implantable 
cardiac defibrillator.25  The Court used Eli Lilly as an opportunity to define whether Section 
271(e)(1) only applies to drugs, or sweeps more inventions under its provisions.26  Justice 
Scalia found that, in reading Section 271(e)(1) in conjunction with Section 100(a), it is clear 
that the phrase “patented invention” as used in Section 271(e)(1) is not limited to a drug 
invention.27  Justice Scalia further found that, in the context of Section 271(e)(1), “a Federal 
Law” means “an entire statutory scheme of regulation.”28  Applied to this case, the Court held 
that Section 271(e)(1) makes the most sense if it applies to all patented inventions regulated 
under a federal law regulating drugs (the FDCA), not only drug inventions themselves.29  
However, the Court noted that neither interpretation was particularly clear.30  This conflict in 
interpretation was further evidenced by Justice Kennedy’s dissent, which took an opposing 
view of the meaning of the statute.31 
                                                 
24 Eli Lilly and Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., 496 U.S. 661 (1990). 
25 Id. at 664. 
26 Id. at 661. 
27 Id. at 665 (Section 100(a) states that the term “invention” means invention or discovery unless contradicted in the 
specific section).  “It shall not be an act of infringement to make, use, or sell a patented invention . . . solely for uses 
reasonably related to the development and submission of information under a Federal law which regulates the 
manufacture, use, or sale of drugs.”  35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (2000) (emphasis added). 
28 Id. at 666-67. 
29 Id. at 665-669. 
30 Id. at 669. 
31 Id. at 679-80 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).  “When § 271(e)(1) speaks of a law which regulates drugs, I think that it 
does not refer to particular enactments or implicate the regulation of anything other than drugs.”  Id. at 680. 
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 The Court found that the shortening and lengthening distortions apply equally to medical 
devices as they do to drugs.32  That is, a medical device that requires FDA approval under the 
FDCA would experience both a shortening distortion of its patent term while the device is 
being approved and a lengthening distortion of its patent term while competitors are awaiting 
their FDA approval after the patent expires.33  Justice Scalia stated that, to hold that the free 
testing safe harbor under Section 271(e)(1) only applies to drugs would contribute to the 
monopoly of medical device patent holders.34  The device would enjoy the patent extension 
under Section 156 to remedy the shortening  distortion, as the device is unquestionably subject 
to regulation under a federal law, but would not be subject to the free testing safe harbor under 
Section 271(e)(1) to remedy the lengthening  distortion.35  Therefore, the Court concluded that 
Sections 156 and 271(e)(1) are meant to be complementary and any product subject to the 
patent term extension under Section 156 should be subject to the patent term reduction via the 
free testing safe harbor under Section 271(e)(1).36  Thus, the Supreme Court had decided the 
definition of “patented invention” in Section 271(e)(1) included at least everything covered by 
Section 156.37 
 B.  Intermedics, Inc. v. Ventritex, Inc. 
 The Northern District of California considered the meaning of the phrase “reasonably 
related” in Intermedics, Inc. v. Ventritex, Inc.38  Similar to Eli Lilly, this case also dealt with the 
alleged infringement of an implantable cardiac defibrillator.39  Ventritex was conducting 
clinical trials, performing demonstrations at trade shows, and selling the defibrillator to 
                                                 
32 Id. at 669-73. 
33 Id. 
34 Id. at 672-73. 
35 Id. 
36 Id. at 673-74. 
37 Id. at 674. 
38 775 F. Supp. 1269 (N.D. Cal. 1991). 
39 Id. at 1272. 
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hospitals and distributors before the Intermedics patent expired.40  Intermedics brought suit and 
Ventritex claimed the free testing safe harbor of Section 271(e)(1) protected them from 
infringement.41 
 Intermedics argued that Section 271(e)(1) should only apply to parties that intend to 
commercialize the product after, not prior to expiration of the pioneer patent.42  The court 
sought to avoid an examination of Ventritex’s intent, holding that it is the actual use, not the 
intent of the party that must be analyzed.43  The court proceeded to parse the statutory 
language, noting that Congress was careful to use the word “use” rather than the word 
“purpose” to show an intent that any test to determine whether the exemption applies be 
objective.44  The court further reasoned that the words “reasonably related” in the statute give 
additional support to an objective test.45  The court added the common sense argument that any 
activity immunized by the statute would ultimately have a business purpose.46  To test whether 
the exemption applied, the court asked whether the uses are ‘“solely . . . reasonably related to 
the development and submission of information’ to the FDA.”47  The court then announced a 
test to determine whether the use was “reasonably related.”48  The key question in this inquiry 
was whether the use would have been  
reasonable, objectively, for a party in defendant's situation to believe that there 
was a decent prospect that the “use” in question would contribute (relatively 
directly) to the generation of kinds of information that was likely to be relevant in 
the processes by which the FDA would decide whether to approve the product.49 
 
                                                 
40 Id. at 1282. 
41 Id. at 1272. 
42 Id. at 1273. 
43 Id. at 1272-75. 
44 Id. at 1278. 
45 Id. at 1279. 
46 Id. at 1279-80. 
47 Id. at 1280. 
48 Id. 
49 Id.  
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Utilizing these tests, the court found that all of Ventritex’s activities were immunized by 
Section 271(e)(1).50 
 C.  Telectronics Pacing Systems, Inc. v. Ventritex, Inc. 
 The Federal Circuit confronted the meaning of “reasonably related” as it is used in 
Section 271(e)(1) in Telectronics Pacing Systems, Inc. v. Ventritex, Inc.51  In 1989, Ventritex 
conducted clinical trials of an implantable defibrillator to obtain operational data for 
submission to the FDA.52  Ventritex also displayed the device at medical conferences to non-
physicians and described the trials to journalists and potential investors for the purpose of 
acquiring funding for manufacturing equipment and additional clinical trials.53   
 The court recognized the need for fundraising to conduct clinical tests even before 
information may be gathered to submit to the FDA.54  This need is especially critical for 
medical device manufacturers who are unable to shorten the time required for FDA submission 
activities by filing an abbreviated application (ANDA) for FDA approval based on the 
submission of the pioneer product.55  The court opined that the intent of Congress was “to 
allow competitors to be in a position to market their products as soon as it was legally 
permissible.”56  The court found the uses at issue fit the meaning of the statute, as the 
Congressional intent included allowing uses of patented inventions “for uses reasonably related 
to clinical trial purposes.”57  
 
                                                 
50 Id. at 1289. 
51 982 F.2d 1520 (Fed. Cir. 1992).  “It shall not be an act of infringement to make, use, or sell a patented invention . . 
. solely for uses reasonably related to the development and submission of information under a Federal law which 
regulates the manufacture, use, or sale of drugs.”  35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (2000) (emphasis added). 
52 Id. at 1521. 
53 Id. at 1521-22. 
54 Id. at 1525. 
55 Id.  For a description of the ANDA process, see Walker, supra note 15 at 19. 
56 Id. 
57 Id. 
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 D.  Abtox, Inc. v. Exitron Corp. 
 At issue in the Abtox case was an apparatus and method for sterilizing medical devices 
using plasma gas.58  The invention involved exciting the plasma gas to a point at which the gas 
emitted light, charged particles, and active components that bombard the medical device, 
thereby sterilizing it.59  Exitron claimed that its limited use of the patented invention was to 
obtain data necessary for a submission to the FDA, and therefore was protected under Section 
271(e)(1).60  Abtox alleged that the purpose of Exitron’s use was not FDA approval, but rather 
to promote the sterilizer to potential customers and persuade them to purchase the rights to the 
product.61  Moreover, Abtox argued that Section 271(e)(1) does not apply to Class II medical 
devices like the sterilizer.62 
 The court initially cited Eli Lilly and summarized the decision of the Supreme Court that 
Section 271(e)(1) applies to medical devices as well as drugs.63  Abtox attempted to distinguish 
the Eli Lilly decision based on the difference between Class II and Class III medical devices.64  
Abtox argued that because Eli Lilly involved a cardiac defibrillator, a Class III medical device 
that required much more extensive FDA pre-market approval, as opposed to the sterilizer at 
issue in the present case, a Class II medical device that enjoyed an abbreviated FDA approval 
process, Eli Lilly did not mandate the application of Section 271(e)(1).65  Under Justice 
Scalia’s reasoning in Eli Lilly, Sections 156 and 271(e)(1) are complementary, as both are 
needed to properly adjust the patent term.66  However, in Abtox, the Class II medical device 
                                                 
58 Abtox, Inc. v. Exitron Corp., 122 F.3d 1019, 1020-21 (Fed. Cir. 1997). 
59 Id. at 1021. 
60 Id. at 1027. 
61 Id. 
62 Id. at 1027-28. 
63 Id. at 1028. 
64 Id. 
65 Id. 
66 See supra Part III.A.  
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was not eligible for a patent term extension under Section 156 because Class II devices are not 
required to undergo the more extensive FDA approval that Class III devices are required to 
meet.67  Therefore, Abtox reasoned, to apply Section 271(e)(1) without Section 156 would be 
incongruous and effectively shorten the patent term of Class II devices.68   
 The Federal Circuit was sympathetic to Abtox’s plight, but ultimately held that the 
Supreme Court’s broader ruling in Eli Lilly governed wherein the statute includes all medical 
devices regardless of class.69  The court noted that there will be occasions where only one of 
Sections 156 and 271(e)(1) apply, but the Supreme Court explicitly accepted this result in Eli 
Lilly.70  The court continued that it must respect both the Eli Lilly decision and the statutory 
language, which does not distinguish between medical device classes.71 
 Finally, the Federal Circuit Court relied on Telectronics in disposing with Abtox’s 
argument based on the “reasonably related” statutory language.72  The court held that Abtox’s 
intent and purpose for the data are irrelevant to a Section 271(e)(1) analysis, and as long as the 
testing is “reasonably related to obtaining FDA approval,” the court will not consider 
alternative uses for the data.73 
 E.  Infigen, Inc. v. Advanced Cell Technology, Inc. 
 The Federal Court for the Western District of Wisconsin looked to the narrow holding 
from Eli Lilly that Sections 156 and 271(e)(1) are complementary in a 1999 case.74  Infigen 
involved the use of a patented method for the artificial stimulation of embryonic development 
                                                 
67 Abtox, 122 F.3d at 1029. 
68 Id. 
69 Id. 
70 Id. 
71 Id. 
72 Id. at 1030. 
73 Id. 
74 Infigen, Inc. v. Advanced Cell Technology, Inc., 65 F. Supp. 2d 967, 979-81 (W.D. Wis. 1999). 
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in cows.75  Advanced Cell argued that it was using Infigen’s patented embryo development 
method to develop a product that would require FDA approval, which brings them under the 
271(e)(1) free testing safe harbor from infringement.76   
 The court rejected Advance Cell’s argument, focusing on Justice Scalia’s complementary 
reasoning from Eli Lilly.77  The district court held that Sections 156 and 271(e)(1) are meant to 
be read together and “[Section] 271(e)(1) applies only to those patents [to be extended under 
Section] 156(a)(4) and (5).”78  The court stated that no cases had been cited to it, nor had it 
found any cases that would apply Section 271(e)(1) to a method or product not subject to 
Section 156.79  The court then cited both Abtox and Eli Lilly in support of this proposition,80 
which completely contradicted the holding in Abtox and ignored part of the Eli Lilly opinion.81  
Unfortunately, the court never reached the question of whether Advanced Cell’s activities were 
“reasonably related” to obtaining an FDA approval because the court disposed of the case 
based solely on the complementary reasoning from Eli Lilly.82   
 F.  Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc. 
 The Southern District of New York interpreted the terms “patented invention” and 
“reasonably related” in Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc.83  Rhone-
Poulenc owned a patent covering a process for preparing the drug taxol and four intermediates 
used in the process.84  These intermediates were used by Rhone-Poulenc both in the process of 
                                                 
75 Id. at 969-70. 
76 Id. at 980. 
77 Id. 
78 Id. 
79 Id. 
80 Id. 
81 See supra Part III.C. 
82 Infigen, 65 F. Supp. 2d at 981.  
83 No. 95-Civ.-8833, 2001 WL 1512597 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 28, 2001). 
84 Id. at *1. 
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preparing taxol and to make other intermediates or products in the claimed process.85  Bristol-
Myers used the claimed intermediates in research on taxol analogs.86  Bristol-Myers claimed 
the protection of Section 271(e)(1) because its research involving the intermediates was solely 
for uses related to the submission of information to the FDA.87  Rhone-Poulenc responded by 
arguing that the intermediates were not a “patented invention” under Section 271(e)(1).88  
Rhone-Poulenc made the same argument to define “patented invention” as Justice Scalia in Eli 
Lilly, that Sections 156 and 271(e)(1) are complementary and only products covered by the 
Section 156 patent term extension should be subject to the free testing safe harbor of Section 
271(e)(1).89  Since the intermediates were not eligible for the patent term extension under 
Section 156, Rhone-Poulenc argued that they were not a “patented invention” within the 
meaning of the statute and should not be subject to Section 271(e)(1).90   
 The district court initially advanced a textual argument, noting that nothing in the statute 
evidences a Congressional intent that Sections 156 and 271(e)(1) be perfectly 
complementary.91  Without this Congressional intent, the court looked to other parts of the 
statute to find that the term “patented invention” applies to all patented inventions.92  As 
support, the district court cited Abtox and Chartex International PLC v. M.D. Personal 
Products Corp., two cases in which a patented invention had been subjected to Section 
271(e)(1), but not Section 156.93  These cases involved Class I and Class II medical devices 
that were not subject to sufficient preclinical testing to obtain the statutory patent term 
                                                 
85 Id. 
86 Id. 
87 Id. at *2. 
88 Id. 
89 Id. 
90 Id. 
91 Id. 
92 Id. 
93 Rhone-Poulenc, 2001 WL 1512597 at *2-3; 5 F.3d 1505 (Fed. Cir. 1993). 
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extension, but were still subject to the free testing safe harbor of Section 271(e)(1).94  
Moreover, the court rejected Rhone-Poulenc’s argument based on Infigen as misplaced, noting 
that the district court in that case must have misread Abtox to conclude that Sections 156 and 
271(e)(1) are perfectly complementary.95 
 Finally, the court turned to the issue of whether Bristol-Myers’ use was “reasonably 
related” to preparing a submission under a federal law within Section 271(e)(1).96  The court 
used the Intermedics test97 to find that Bristol-Myers’ use of the patented intermediates was 
reasonably related to the submission of information under a federal law.98  The court found 
particularly relevant the fact that Bristol-Myers’ research was focused on finding a replacement 
for Taxol once the patent on the drug expired.99 
 G.  Merck KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd. 
 In 2005, the Supreme Court heard a case defining the “reasonably related” boundary line 
involving a peptide used in biotechnology research.100  Integra owned patents related to the 
tripeptide sequence known as the “RGD peptide.”101  Merck began funding research by Dr. 
David Cheresh relating to angiogenesis, the process by which new blood vessels grow from 
existing blood vessels.102  Dr. Cheresh used the RGD peptide to develop three closely related 
peptides, and established one that Merck decided to pursue for regulatory approval.103  Integra 
brought suit, claiming that Merck, the Scripps Research Institute (the location where research 
                                                 
94 Rhone-Poulenc, 2001 WL 1512597 at *3. 
95 Id. at *3 n.5. 
96 Id. at *4. 
97 See supra Part II.B. 
98 Rhone-Poulenc, 2001 WL 1512597 at *4. 
99 Id. 
100 Merck KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd., 545 U.S. 193 (2005). 
101 Id. at 197. 
102 Id. 
103 Id. at 198-99. 
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was conducted), and Dr. Cheresh infringed the patents owned by Integra related to the RGD 
peptide.104   
 The Federal Circuit Court of Appeals unanimously found that Integra’s patents covered 
the peptides developed by Dr. Cheresh and, by a divided panel, found that Section 271(e)(1) 
did not harbor the three defendants from infringement because their activities were “not 
clinical testing to supply information to the FDA, but only general biomedical research to 
identify new pharmaceutical compounds.”105  The court held that the FDA is not interested in 
the “hunt for drugs,” but rather it seeks information regarding a drug that is actually submitted 
for regulatory approval.106  In taking a narrow view of Section 271(e)(1), the court found that 
activities not directly producing FDA information strain the meaning of the statute,107 as 
“reasonably related” to FDA approval did not, in the court’s opinion, embrace all phases of 
research simply because the end product will require FDA approval.108  The Federal Circuit 
expressed concern that expanding the free testing safe harbor under Section 271(e)(1) to these 
ends would threaten the rights of research tool patent holders because research tools are used to 
identify viable drug candidates and facilitate further research, both uses that would fit within an 
expanded scope of the statute.109  Judge Newman argued in dissent for a resurrection of the 
common law research exemption.110  She claimed that this exemption would not swallow 
research tools because of the fundamental difference between “use of an existing tool in one’s 
research [and] study of the tool itself.”111 
                                                 
104 Id. at 200. 
105 Id. at 201; Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd. v. Merck KGaA, 331 F.3d 860, 866 (Fed. Cir. 2003), rev’d, 545 U.S. 193 
(2005).  
106 Id. 
107 Id. 
108 Id. at 867. 
109 Id. 
110 Id. at 874-76. 
111 Id. at 878. 
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 The case was appealed to the Supreme Court, where Justice Scalia wrote the majority 
opinion.  From the outset of the opinion, Justice Scalia made it clear that “[Section] 271(e)(1)'s 
exemption from infringement extends to all uses of patented inventions that are reasonably 
related to the development and submission of any information under the FDCA.”112  The Court 
found no valid reason for “excluding certain information from the exemption on the basis of 
the phase of research in which it is developed or the particular submission in which it could be 
included.”113  This expansive reading of Section 271(e)(1) included information not expressly 
requested by the FDA, but that would give the FDA a more complete picture of the drug’s 
effects and allow an FDA investigator to make an informed decision whether to allow the 
proposed trial to move forward.114 
 Justice Scalia agreed with the Federal Circuit majority that experimenting on a compound 
without any intent or reasonable expectation of submitting information to the FDA would not 
qualify for the free testing safe harbor under Section 271(e)(1).115  However, Justice Scalia did 
not find that this premise necessarily prohibited free testing safe harbor protection for activities 
that do not ultimately result in an FDA submission due to the inherent uncertainty of when 
research is initiated.116  The test announced by the Court is whether a researcher “has a 
reasonable basis for believing that a patented compound may work . . . and uses the compound 
in research that, if successful, would be appropriate to include in a submission to the FDA.”117  
Similarly, the Court noted that research producing data not ultimately submitted to the FDA is 
not automatically placed outside of the Section 271(e)(1) free testing safe harbor.118  In 
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addition to the uncertainty of research, the information required by the FDA may vary from 
case to case.119  Although the Court declined to comment directly on the applicability of free 
testing under Section 271(e)(1) to research tools,120 the opinion provides some general 
principles that may be extrapolated to this area. 
 H.  Proveris Scientific Corp. v. Innovasystems, Inc. 
 The Federal Circuit Court directly addressed the applicability of Section 271(e)(1) to 
research tools in a 2008 case.121  Proveris Scientific owned a patent covering an aerosol spray 
characterization system.122  The system was used in research to allow calibrated measurement 
of aerosol spray drugs.123  Hence, the system was used in obtaining FDA approvals for 
inhalers, but the system itself was not subject to FDA approval.124  Innovasystems made an 
Optical Spray Analyzer (OSA) that was similarly not subject to FDA approval, but was used to 
measure nasal drug aerosol sprays in connection with submissions to the FDA.125  Proveris 
brought an infringement claim, and Innovasystems asserted the 271(e)(1) free testing safe 
harbor.126 
 The court noted that the meaning of the terms “patented invention” and “reasonably 
related” were critical to this decision.127  The court reviewed the two patent term distortions 
that the Hatch Waxman Act was designed to remedy, and found that, since Innovasystems’s 
OSA is not itself subject to FDA premarket approval (the lengthening distortion), Congress did 
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not intent the product to come under Section 271(e)(1).128  Moreover, Proveris did not 
experience the shortening distortion because it was similarly not subject to the FDA approval 
process.129  The court reasoned that its interpretation of “patented invention” complied with Eli 
Lilly because it took a complimentary view of Sections 156 and 271(e)(1).130  The Federal 
Circuit Court proceeded to describe a “perfect product fit” when the term “patented invention” 
is interpreted to “include all products listed in [Section] 156(f).”131  Finally, the argument by 
Innovasystems that its use was “reasonably related” to a submission to the FDA was not 
addressed by the court, as the interpretation of “patented invention” was considered dispositive 
in the case.132 
III. Proveris Leaves the Door Open to an In-House Research Exemption 
 Although Proveris came down against research tools being protected by Section 
271(e)(1), it may have left the door open to in-house research tools used in pursuit of FDA 
approval.  The Proveris case dealt with a company, Innovasystems, that sold its Optical Spray 
Analyzer exclusively to pharmaceutical companies and the FDA.133  In its opinion, the court 
focused on the definition of “patented invention” in holding that Innovasytems was not 
protected by Section 271(e)(1), and did not even address whether Innovasystems’ acts were 
“reasonably related” to an FDA approval under the statute.134  A future court may be able to 
get around the “patented invention” interpretation of the Proveris court, focus on the definition 
of “reasonably related,” and include in-house research tools under Section 271(e)(1).   
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 First, the Proveris court anchored its interpretation of “patented invention” on the 
complementariness of Sections 156 and 271(e)(1) as announced in Eli Lilly.135  The court 
reasoned that, in order to satisfy Congressional intent, the Section 271(e)(1) free testing safe 
harbor should include all products qualifying for a patent term extension under Section 156.136  
However, this principle has been less than clear in the cases preceding Proveris.  In Abtox, the 
Federal Circuit Court acknowledged, but refused to apply the complementariness of Sections 
156 and 271(e)(1) in holding that all medical devices are within Section 271(e)(1).137  This 
effectively allowed Class II medical devices to suffer the free testing immunization of 
potentially infringing activities under Section 271(e)(1) while not gaining the beneficial patent 
term extension under Section 156.  Both the Abtox court and the Eli Lilly Court explicitly 
accepted the premise that occasionally there will be a product that is subject to only one of the 
two sections of the statute, despite the seemingly inequitable results.138  Rhone-Poulenc added 
to this line of judicial reasoning, as the court found no Congressional intent that Sections 156 
and 271(e)(1) be perfectly complementary.139  Moreover, the Rhone-Poulenc court found that 
the term “patented invention” in the statute means any invention, not just drug inventions.140  
The court in Proveris seems to have either missed these non-complementary applications of 
Sections 156 and 271(e)(1) or ignored them, similar to the court in Infigen.141   
 Second, an in-house research tool used in pursuit of FDA approval would fit well within 
the definition of “reasonably related” as established by case law.  The Intermedics decision 
provides a test for the “reasonably related” language of the statute that asks whether the uses 
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are ‘“solely . . . reasonably related to the development and submission of information’ to the 
FDA.”142  Justice Scalia’s definition of “reasonably related” as announced in Merck provided 
the latest insight into the meaning of the language as it applies to Section 271(e)(1).143  The 
Court only required that a researcher have a reasonable basis to believe the data gathered 
would be submitted to the FDA for the potentially infringing activities to be protected by 
Section 271(e)(1).144  An in-house research tool used to detect and record data during research 
intended to culminate in an FDA submission and approval is “reasonably related” to FDA 
submission activities as defined by both Intermedics and Merck.  A researcher pursuing FDA 
approval would necessarily have a reasonable basis to believe that the data gathered would 
result in a submission to the FDA, as that is the ultimate pursuit.  Moreover, if the researcher 
was focused on pursuing FDA approval, his uses of patented research tools would be solely 
reasonably related to an FDA submission. 
 Third, an in-house research tool used in pursuit of FDA approval is arguably more 
“reasonably related” to an FDA approval than an “outside” research tool made and sold to 
pharmaceutical researchers by a commercial company.  In the former scenario, the researcher 
is making his own tool and all of his activities are aligned and focused on the end product, an 
FDA approval.  The researcher is not concerned with commercial exploitation of the tool.  In 
the latter scenario, a company totally removed from the research is mass-producing research 
tools that may or may not be used in pursuit of FDA approval.  The focus is no longer 
exclusively on the pursuit of FDA approval and has strayed to commercial gain directly linked 
to the research tool itself.  Some companies may use the tool not for pursuing FDA approval, 
but for pure product development to detect which products are the most effective.  Granted, the 
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Eli Lilly decision allows alternative uses for research data as long as at least one use for the 
data is pursuit of FDA approval, but an “outside” research tool seems to be more towards the 
boundary line of “reasonably related” whereas an in-house research tool would fall more 
towards the interior of the definition.  Therefore, Proveris has arguably left the door open to in-
house research tools based on the definitions of “patented invention” and “reasonably related” 
to an FDA approval, as developed through case law. 
IV. Arguments For and Against an In-House Research Tool Exemption 
 There are many arguments that can be made for and against the inclusion of in-house 
research tools in the free testing safe harbor of Section 271(e)(1).  The following is an 
exploration of these arguments.  To put a label on each side of the debate, arguments in favor 
of inclusion of in-house research tools in Section 271(e)(1) will be made by “proponents” and 
arguments against inclusion will be made by “critics.” 
A. Research Tools and the Twin Distortions 
 The purpose behind the enactment of Sections 156 and 271(e)(1) were to remedy two 
distortions in the patent term for “patented inventions” that were subject to a federal approval 
process.145  As described earlier, the shortening distortion was an effective shortening of the 
patent term caused by the delay in obtaining federal approval.146  This was compensated for by 
an automatic extension of the patent term in Section 156.147  The lengthening distortion was an 
effective lengthening of the patent term caused by the delay in competitors obtaining federal 
approval.148  This was remedied by the free testing safe harbor in Section 271(e)(1).149 
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 Research tools are generally not subject to federal approval.  The tools are simply an 
avenue to obtain data that may be submitted for federal approval.  Since research tools are not 
subject to federal approval, patent holders do not experience the shortening distortion while 
waiting for federal approval.  Once a research tool is patented, or even before it is patented, it 
can immediately be placed in the commercial market and the patent owner may begin 
recouping the corresponding research investment in the tool.  This lack of delay in entering the 
market concludes that research tools are not subject to the patent term extension of Section 
156.150   
 Similarly, research tools do not experience the lengthening distortion due to competitors 
awaiting their own federal approval before they may enter the commercial market.  Research 
tool competitors may enter the market immediately upon expiration of the pioneer patent.  
Courts have taken two different approaches to relating Sections 156 and 271(e)(1) in this 
situation.  A court taking a purely complementary approach to Sections 156 and 271(e)(1) 
would conclude that since research tools do not qualify for patent term extensions under 
Section 156, they do not qualify for the free testing safe harbor under 271(e)(1).  This approach 
was taken by the courts in Infigen and Proveris.151  However, if a court takes the view of the 
court in Abtox, Rhone-Poulenc, or arguably Eli Lilly,152 it may find that research tools qualify 
for free testing under Section 271(e)(1) because they satisfy the definitions of “patented 
invention” and “reasonably related” to FDA approval, even though they do not qualify for a 
patent term extension under Section 156.  Despite the two judicial possibilities, critics of an in-
house research tool exemption would conclude that since research tools experience neither of 
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the twin distortions the Hatch-Waxman Act was intended to remedy, no research tool patent, 
in-house or otherwise, should be subject to the Section 271(e)(1) free testing safe harbor. 
B. Does an In-house Research Tool Exemption Further the Original Public Policy? 
 The overarching public policy reason for the Hatch-Waxman Act was a money savings 
by facilitating the quick arrival of generic drugs to market once the pioneer patent expired.153  
The sooner in the process the generic drugs were commercially available, the sooner the 
American people and insurance companies would begin to save money by purchasing the 
generic versions of prescription medications.  To this end, the Hatch-Waxman Act removed 
patent barriers to allow generic drug producers to freely test the drug during the life of the 
patent.  There is a direct relationship between the action Congress took and the policy reasons 
for the action. 
 It may be argued that extending the Hatch-Waxman Act to cover in-house research tools 
would further the public policy reasons for the Act itself.  Allowing drug companies to make 
their own research tools would decrease the cost of research and testing, and may ultimately 
hasten the arrival of the generic drug to market.  This would result in a money savings for 
prescription drug purchasers felt earlier in the life of the particular drug. 
 Alternatively, it may also be argued that extending this legislation to research tools of any 
sort, even in-house research tools, is not in furtherance of the limited policy objectives of the 
Hatch-Waxman Act.  The Act was intended to hasten the arrival of generic drugs to market 
once the pioneer patent expired.  This means taking all reasonable action to allow the generic 
drug to be ready for market, but preventing profiting before the pioneer patent expired.  If the 
Section 271(e)(1) free testing exemption from infringement were applied to research tools, it 
would overshoot the intended purpose of bringing generics to market quickly and allow all 
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drug companies to enjoy using research tools without permission from or payment to the patent 
owner.  This may lower drug prices, but the policy behind it would be lowering drug prices at 
any cost, which sweeps too broad for this legislation and may have other implications to 
innovation, which are discussed in the next section. 
C. Loss of Incentive to Innovate in the Area of Research Tools  
 Congress and the courts must maintain a balance of two competing policy interests when 
considering including in-house research tools under the free testing safe harbor of Section 
271(e)(1).  The first was mentioned in the previous section, bringing generic drugs to market 
quickly after the pioneer patent expires.154  The second competing policy interest is specific to 
the patent system and is maintaining the incentive to invent.155  Proponents of an in-house 
research tool free testing exemption would argue that alleviating the cost of paying patent 
holders royalties to use their tools would not stymie innovation, but would rather foster 
advancement in many different areas of research.  Expensive research tools have the effect of 
grinding research to a halt because the researcher first has to acquire the significant investment 
necessary to purchase the research tools, assuming the patent holder is not withholding the tool 
altogether to gain an advantage in the field.156  Reducing this cost and not subjecting 
researchers to the will of the patent holder would allow companies to reallocate that part of 
their budget designated for funding research tools to further innovation and research. 
 Critics of an in-house research tool exemption would argue that inclusion would reduce 
the incentive to innovate that is at the core of our patent system.  Since its inception the patent 
system has been based on an even exchange.  The inventor provides a full disclosure of the 
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invention which allows others to fully understand exactly what the invention is and the 
technological advance involved.  In exchange, the inventor obtains the right to exclude others 
from practicing his invention for a period of time.  This system gives appropriate incentive for 
individuals to invent by rewarding them with the opportunity to recoup their research expenses 
and potentially experience a surplus financial gain.  The system also fosters innovation by 
creating incentives for inventors to share their technology.  Once a patent expires, that piece of 
technology falls into the public domain and other inventors are free to use and build on it.  
Critics would argue that if we take away this even exchange for research tools by allowing 
companies to make their own version free and clear, the effect would be the end of research 
tool development.  The major driver of innovation is the prospect of financial gain from 
exclusivity.  Without this potential, corporations will stop investing in research tool innovation 
because it would be impossible for them to recoup the expenses involved in research.   
 Critics would also argue that the government should not take patent rights away from one 
technology area without an adequate substitute, regardless of the public policy reasons.  The 
Hatch-Waxman Act already affects the patent rights of some patent holders, but the safeguards 
put in place, including the automatic patent term extension under Section 156 and the 
“reasonably related to a federal regulatory approval” language in Section 271(e)(1), 
substantially protect the rights of the patent holder.  The case of an in-house research tool 
exemption is very different.  This would effectively take away all patent rights for research tool 
companies because their target market, researchers, would be able to look up the relevant 
patent, build their own research tool, and not pay the patent holder a dime.  It is very important 
that the American people have affordable prescription drugs, but the cost in this case would be 
all future innovation in the field of research tools.   
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 Critics would further argue that losing the incentive to innovate in the area of research 
tools would result in an increase in trade secret protection for research tool designs.  Trade 
secrets provide protection for devices, formulas, and processes for as long as the secret is held 
in confidence.157  Trade secrets provide incentive for the owner of the technology to resist 
disclosure, or he would lose his trade secret protection, and his monopoly on the technology.  
Therefore, not only would there be a lack of incentive to innovate in the area of research tools, 
but if any innovation were to occur, there would be an incentive to keep the innovation secret.  
This strays even farther from the fundamentals of the patent system in fostering innovation 
through disclosure. 
 Proponents of an in-house research tool exemption would respond that pharmaceutical 
companies and others that perform research on products requiring FDA approval would still 
have adequate incentive to move research tool technology forward.  The FDA would still 
require the same data to approve a product.  It would be the researchers’ responsibility to 
satisfy the FDA requirements.  In an effort to cut costs and become more efficient, companies 
would try to develop better tools to provide the required data.  In addition to the FDA 
submission requirements, for some technologies, the furtherance of the technology itself 
depends on the development of research tools.  In the field of biotechnology many intermediate 
elements, compounds, and peptides are used as research tools to discover new drugs.158  In 
these cases, the researchers would be free to experiment and develop new research tools, and 
therefore new end products without being encumbered by the consideration of patent rights.  
Individual researchers and corporations alike would have incentive to make their research 
better through in-house research tool development. 
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D. Legislative History Arguments 
 Critics of an in-house research tool exemption would point to the legislative history of the 
Hatch-Waxman Act to argue that research tools were never intended to be covered by the 
legislation.  The House and Senate debates focused on drugs, including the balance between 
the need to protect the rights of pioneer drug makers and the need to bring generic drugs to the 
public.159  Congress never considered research tools or even medical devices as being part of 
the Hatch-Waxman Act.160  Congress even stated that the purpose behind Section 271(e)(1) 
was to allow a generic drug manufacturer to get some of the patented drug to test during the 
life of the patent term.161  None of the legislative history behind the Act shows that the 
inclusion of research tools was either intended or contemplated.162 
 Proponents of an in-house research tool exemption would respond by noting that, 
regardless of the legislative history of the Act, no language was added to the legislation itself to 
give effect to the legislative intent.  For example, even though the House and Senate debates 
focused on discussions regarding drugs, no language appears in the Hatch-Waxman Act 
limiting its application to drugs.163  Instead, Section 271(e)(1) employs language like “patented 
invention” and “reasonably related to a federal approval.”   
 Proponents would further argue that even though medical devices may have not been 
discussed or considered by Congress, courts have held that medical devices are covered by the 
statute.  In Eli Lilly and Co. v. Medtronic the Supreme Court held that Section 271(e)(1) 
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includes medical devices, in that case an implantable defibrillator.164  Again in Abtox, Inc. v. 
Exitron Corp., the Federal Circuit Court affirmed the Eli Lilly decision and held that Section 
271(e)(1) applies to all medical devices, regardless of their class.165  Therefore, regardless of 
what Congress did or did not intend, courts have been interpreting the statute as though it 
applies to a wider range of inventions than just drugs.  The seeming inconsistency of Abtox in 
that Section 271(e)(1) was applied to a Class II device without the complementary Section 156, 
gives even more credence to the proponents’ argument.  Even if a statutory construction does 
not seem to make intuitive sense, the court makes the final interpretation.  It is the court that 
decides what is covered by Section 271(e)(1), regardless of how Congress would seem to have 
applied the statute. 
 Proponents may also argue that the cases from this line contain clues evidencing a 
disregard for the legislative history behind the statute.  First, in Eli Lilly, Eli Lilly’s main 
argument was that the legislative history showed an intent by Congress that only drugs be 
covered by the statute.166  Justice Scalia dispensed with this argument, stating that it is one 
thing for the legislative history to only discuss drugs, but it is very different for the statute to 
actually state that it only applies to drugs.167  He added that “[i]t is not the law that a statute can 
have no effects which are not explicitly mentioned in its legislative history.”168  The second 
aversion to legislative history in this line of cases was in Telectronics Pacing Systems, Inc. v. 
Ventritex, Inc.169  In that case the Federal Circuit Court addressed another legislative history 
argument, noting that if a statute is clear, the plain meaning will govern.  The court stated that 
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while legislative history can assist when a statute is unclear, “when the legislature has clearly 
spoken the law, the court's duty is to enforce it as written.”170  The third case involving a 
legislative history argument was the decision out of the Southern District of New York in 
Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc.171  The court dispensed with Rhone-
Poulenc’s legislative history argument, and added that the Supreme Court has cautioned 
against relying on the statements of a few members of Congress to prove the intent of the entire 
body in passing the law.172  The court noted that the only reliable way to know the intent of the 
members of Congress who passed the law is to look at the words of the law itself.173  Finally, 
the Federal Circuit Court decision in Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd. v. Merck KGaA174 provides 
another example of a judge discounting the legislative intent behind the Hatch-Waxman Act.  
In dissent, Judge Newman noted that even though the original purpose of Section 271(e)(1) 
was to facilitate bringing generic drugs to market, courts have interpreted the statute more 
broadly.175  Judge Newman reasoned that it was the interpretation of the courts that the Federal 
Circuit Court must apply in the case.176 
 From these four examples, the proponent of an in-house research tool exemption may 
argue that the legislative history and original intent of Congress in passing the Hatch-Waxman 
Act are not as important as the way courts have interpreted the Act.  It is the courts’ duty to 
interpret the law.  The expanded interpretation evidenced by these cases must be applied going 
forward. 
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CONCLUSION 
 Hopefully the opportunity to consider the application of free testing under Section 
271(e)(1) to in-house research tools arises in the near future.  There are quality arguments both 
for and against the inclusion of the tools.  Congress and the courts must take care to preserve 
the delicate balance between disclosure and exclusivity, which is involved in the application 
and issuance of every patent.  Upsetting the balance may result in an erosion of patent 
protection for research tools that would halt innovation and further stray from the original 
principles of the American patent system. 
